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AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS CONTROL 
IN A COMPETITIVE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT: AT WHAT PRICE? 
Stuart Boose 
Introduction 
Automobiles have an enormous impact 
on our daily lives. Most of our lifestyles are 
built around the mobility provided by driving 
to work, to the store, or to a friend 's house. One 
of the prices we pay for this convenience is the 
slow deterioration of our environment due to 
automotive emissions. This deterioration is 
not just an aesthetic problem. Automotive 
emissions present a major health risk, and 
consequently the automotive industry is one 
of the most regulated in the United States 
today. This paper reviews the evolution of 
these regulations and discusses their impact 
in a competitive global marketplace. 
History of Environmental Regulation 
of the U.S. Auto Industry 
The Air Quality Act of 1967 was the first 
major piece of clean air legislation to have an 
impact on the automobile industry. The act 
provided more money for research on emis-
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sion controls, but it also set some important 
precedents. The act was the first to be written 
with the underlying premise that manufactur-
ers would never install costly control equip-
ment on their own initiative. In addition the 
act established the federal government's power 
to regulate auto emissions. The states had to 
comply with federal policy, but could legislate 
tougher standards if they so desired. 
In 1969 Congressional debate over the 
Clean Air Act began to center around the 
question of "technology forcing. " Many Con-
gressmen felt that adequate control technolo-
gies would not be developed unless the gov-
ernment legislated emissions limits which 
would force manufacturers to improve exist-
ing technologies. This concept was eventually 
accepted, and air pollution regulation changed 
drastically. Included in the Clean Air Act of 
1970 were the original National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NMQS.) The NMQS set 
emissions goals for hydrocarbons, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen oxides at five to ten 
percent of the average levels for 1968 model 
automobiles. The hydrocarbon and carbon 
monoxide levels-0.41 and 3.4 grams per mile-
were to be implemented by 1975. The accept-
able level of emissions of nitrogen oxides was 
set at 0.4 grams per mile and was to be reached 
by 1976. In addition, the act established ongo-
ing air quality testing all over the country. An 
area which does not meet the ambient air 
quality standard for a certain pollutant is said 
to be a "non-attainment" area for that standard. 
Since these standards were based on pos-
sible future technology rather than on cur-
rently attainable levels, the automakers ap-
plied for and received extensions for 
compliance. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977legislated more realistic time constraints 
for manufacturers to meet the standards. The 
original hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide 
standards were postponed until1980. The stan-
dard for nitrogen oxides was relaxed to 2.0 
grams per mile before 1980 and 1.0 after. The 
1977 amendments also set a limit of2.0 grams 
per mile on particulate emissions for cars 
produced after the 1980 model year and estab-
lished the National Commission on Air Quality 
to study the effects of the clean air legislation. 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
constitute a very comprehensive package of 
reforms to existing clean air legislation. The 
sections of the law which deal with the auto-
motive industry tighten emissions standards 
and testing procedures, regulate public and 
private fleets of vehicles, and set standards for 
fuel content and handling. 
The new emissions standards for non-
methane hydrocarbons (NMHC) and carbon 
monoxide (CO) for passenger cars will be phased 
in over a period of several years. For model 
year 1994 each manufacturer must produce 
40% of its fleet of passenger cars and light 
trucks in compliance. The percentage is in-
creased to 80% for model year 1995 and 100% 
thereafter. The standards for the first five years 
or 50,000 miles are 0.25 grams per mile of 
NMHC and 3.4 grams per mile of CO. For the 
subsequent five years the standards are relaxed 
to 0.31 grams per mile ofNMHC and 4.2 grams 
per mile of CO. 
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New limits have also been set for emis-
sions of nitrogen oxides and particulate mat-
ter. In model year 1994 each manufacturer 
must have 40% compliance in its fleet of pas-
senger cars, increasing to 100% in subsequent 
years. For light trucks 40% must comply in 
1995 and 100% thereafter. For passenger cars 
and light trucks with a fully loaded rating 
below 3750 pounds, the acceptable limits are 
0.4 grams per mile of nitrogen oxides and 0.08 
grams per mile of particulate matter. For trucks 
up to 6000 pounds the nitrogen oxide standard 
is relaxed to 1.0 gram per mile. 
The new law also gives the EPA Adminis-
trator the authority to tighten the standards 
for model year 2003 if he feels it necessary to 
attain NMQS and the technology is available 
and cost-effective. The allowable limits are: 
0.125 grams per mile ofNMHC, 1.7 grams per 
mile of CO, and 0.2 grams per mile of nitrogen 
oxides. The standards set by the Administrator 
would hold for ten years or 100,000 miles, 
whichever came first. 
New equipment required in passenger 
cars and light trucks includes emissions diag-
nostic systems and onboard vapor recovery 
systems. The diagnostic systems must be ca-
pable of detecting malfunctions in emissions 
systems and alerting vehicle owners. All sys-
tems must also use standard connectors and 
must not depend on proprietary technology; 
this is to facilitate the repair of emissions 
control systems produced by all manufactur-
ers. The vapor recovery systems are cannisters 
capable of capturing 95% of evaporative emis-
sions during refueling. 
Starting with model year 1995, manufac-
turers will be required to guarantee their prod-
ucts to be free from emissions defects for two 
years or 24,000 miles. This warranty will apply to 
all components except the catalytic converter 
and the electronic control system, which must be 
warrantied for eight years or 80,000 miles. 
Finally, the amendments require states 
with either a serious, severe, or extreme ozone 
non-attainment area with a population of at 
least 250,000 or a CO non-attainment area 
with a 1988 design value (the value which the 
EPA set in a 1988 plan) of at least sixteen parts 
per million to devise clean-fueled fleet vehicle 
programs. A fleet is defined to be ten or more 
vehicles, owned or operated by a single person, 
not including vehicles for rental or sale, police 
and emergency vehicles, off-road vehicles and 
farm equipment. The vehicles which must be 
regulated are those in the fleet which are 
capable of being centrally refueled. The pro-
grams must require new fleet vehicles to be 
clean-fueled. In addition, the fleets must con-
sist of30% clean-fueled vehicles by 1995, 50% 
by 1996, and 70% by 1998. The EPA Adminis-
trator must issue specific emissions standards 
for clean-fuel vehicles within a year of passage 
of the law. The state plans must also allow the 
fleet operator to choose alternative fuels and 
vehicles within the limits set by the EPA. 
The sections of the law which concern 
fuels require the EPA Administrator to issue 
regulations for cleaner, less volatile· gasoline 
within a year of the law's passage. States con-
taining even part of a moderate or serious CO 
non-attainment area must submit plans to 
ensure that all gasoline sold in these areas 
contain not less than 2. 7% oxygen. 
The Price of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 
The amendments to the Clean Air Act will 
affect the industry by increasing costs for both 
domestic and foreign firms. Although some 
costs are direct and relatively easy to estimate, 
others arise indirectly and can only be esti-
mated very roughly. As of this writing there are 
no comprehensive public estimates of the cost 
of compliance with the new amendments. 
There are, however, estimates of the cost of 
compliance with a very similar bill, S.l894, 
which was presented by the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works on Novem-
ber 20, 1987. The bill was eventually tabled. All 
of the following cost estimates are taken from 
a Congressional Research Service report by 
David E. Gushee entitled "Emission Controls 
on Motor Vehicles and Fuels," last updated 
April 13, 1988. The added costs to the manu-
facturers will be in the following areas: in-
creased research, more expensive emissions 
controls, onboard vapor recovery systems, in-
creased recall rates, and increased warranty costs. 
The more stringent emissions standards 
will require a massive increase in research 
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spending to meet the requirements. The fact 
that the legislation is "technology forcing" 
only adds to the cost. In other words, instead of 
paying development costs to adapt existing 
technology to automotive controls, the manu-
facturers must develop completely new tech-
nologies. The increasing complexity of control 
systems makes them more expensive, as the 
permissible limits of emissions become more 
strict. Although it is impossible to price con-
trols which do not yet exist, the most likely 
cost per car is expected to be between $50 and 
$150. Applying these estimates to the twelve 
million cars sold in the United States in recent 
years yields a total cost of between $600 mil-
lion and $1.8 billion per year. (Gushee, 1988, 
p. 9) Under the assumption that light trucks 
will need controls comparable to those for 
large cars, the cost might be increased by $200 
million to $520 million annually. These fig-
ures assume light truck sales of around 3.5 
million vehicles. (Gushee, 1988, p.l4) It is also 
assumed that the EPA Administrator will not 
feel the need to further tighten emissions 
requirements for the 2003 model year. If twelve 
or more of the "seriously polluted" cities fail to 
attain the NMQS, the costs of implementing 
the next phase of emissions standards will be 
enormous. Since the second phase involves 
halving the emissions of hydrocarbons and 
nitrogen oxides, a conservative cost estimate 
is twice as much as the first phase for a total of 
between two and five billion dollars. 
It is difficult to estimate the cost of in-
stalling the onboard vapor control cannisters 
in production quantities. The EPA submitted 
an estimate of $20 per car, but Toyota testified 
before a Senate subcommittee that the cost 
would likely be closer to $100 per car. Install-
ing these systems even at a fleet average of $50 
per vehicle will cost manufacturers another 
$800 million per year. (Gushee, 1988, p. 34) 
Currently manufacturers experience an 
overall recall rate of about 10% at an average 
cost of $50 per recall. Manufacturers expect 
both their rate and average costs to rise due to 
the new legislation. The doubled warranty 
period on emissions control systems, increased 
data on emissions control system deteriora-
tion from state testing programs and a new 
clause in the law will raise the recall rate. The 
new clause now makes manufacturers liable 
for emissions system problems which occur 
after "normal" maintenance and not "proper" 
maintenance as the existing law requires. Al-
though the difference in wording seems slight, 
the old law made it possible for manufacturers 
to claim that a vehicle with a damaged emis-
sions control system was not "properly main-
tained." "Normal maintenance" implies only 
the automotive care taken by an average owner. 
Again manufacturers will feel the cost of more 
expensive controls which will raise the average 
cost of recalling a car for emissions problems. 
If the rate increases another ten percentage points 
and the average cost doubles, the additional cost 
will be another $120 million per year.(Gushee, 
1988, p. 11) Applying the same assumption of 
a ten percentage point increase in truck recalls 
and assuming that average recall costs will be 
higher than that for cars because of larger and 
most likely more complex control systems, the 
cost to the industry will be about $44 million 
per year.(Gushee, 1988, p. 14) 
The increased warranty period and more 
sophisticated control devices are expected to 
lead to an increase in warranty work. These 
control devices are not only more liable to fail, 
but also are more expensive to repair. Gushee 
estimates that the additional cost will be twice 
the increase in recall costs or another $240 
million per year.(Gushee, 1988, p. 12) Using 
the same logic to estimate the increased cost of 
honoring truck warranties yields an additional 
cost of$88 million ayear.(Gushee, 1988, p. 14) 
All in all, the total cost to manufacturers 
of the above requirements is in the range of 
$1.8 to $3.4 billion per year. Even an industry 
as large as the automobile industry will be hurt 
by increases that large. Although the laws 
apply to all firms selling automobiles in the 
United States market, the costs are not neces-
sarily the same for domestic and foreign manu-
facturers. The costs differ because of each 
manufacturer's position in the market, as the 
next two sections will show. 
The Present State of the Automobile 
Industry 
In 1961 Volkswagen sold 177,000 cars in 
America for 46.8% of the import market. 
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(Halberstam, p. 425) Japanese manufacturers, 
notably Nissan and Toyota, were understand-
ably anxious to enter the lucrative American 
automobile market and they followed the ex-
ample set by Volkswagen. The economical im-
ports became much more popular in the wake 
of gasoline shortages in the early seventies. 
Later, throughout the seventies and eighties, 
however, the European and Japanese manu-
facturers have pursued different strategies to 
raise profits. The Europeans have shifted their 
product lines toward high-profit luxury cars 
and have developed a reputation for high tech-
nology with innovations like electronic fuel 
injection and antilock brakes. The Japanese, 
on the other hand, have concentrated on sell-
ing more cars by developing a reputation for 
the quality of their small cars and pickup 
trucks. Throughout this period American 
manufacturers have continued to produce the 
traditional "family-sized" car that had been so 
popular for the last forty years. Many of the 
Japanese manufacturers are now aggressively 
marketing high-performance luxury sedans 
withadvancedmultivalveengineswhileAmeri-
can manufacturers continue to plod along 
with the same strategies used by Alfred Sloan 
and Henry Ford Sr. in the 1920's. 
American manufacturers face many ob-
stacles to regaining world competitiveness in 
the automobile industry. Among these are 
outdated products, high costs, poor customer 
relations, public perception of poor quality, 
inefficient spending, and a long product devel-
opment process. 
As an example of an outdated product, 
consider the Mustang, Ford's best selling sports 
car. The Mustang has not undergone any ma-
jor changes since 1978. Rather than develop-
ing new models, American manufacturers have 
too often revamped old ones with new styling 
and added more expensive interiors and "stan-
dard" features to increase profits. 
Many of Detroit's problems stem from 
the high costs of parts, labor, and capital. For 
decades the Big Three automakers have been 
pursuing short-term gains at the expense of 
closer ties to their suppliers. Instead of devel-
oping symbiotic working relationships with 
suppliers, the Big Three have focused on bot-
tom-dollar procurement processes. They are 
now paying the price in higher parts costs. 
Similarly the Big Three are still paying dearly 
for their past mistakes in labor relations. Al-
though union membership nationwide has 
fallen greatly in the past twenty years, the auto 
industry unions are still very powerful. 
Throughout the seventies, unions demanded 
and received wages that increased faster than 
productivity growth, which proved to be a 
major burden on the American automakers. 
Only in recent years have the Big Three been 
able to convince the unions to agree to wage 
concessions. Even with the concessions, union-
ized autoworkers still receive wages that are 
significantly higher than the average indus-
trial worker. Some Japanese auto plants in the 
United States hire only nonunion labor at a 
savings of ten dollars an hour.(Taylor, p. 62) 
Parts and labor are not the only expensive 
commodities used by the American auto in-
dustry. Although there are opposing view-
points on the extent of the problem, most 
economists agree that the cost of capital is 
higher in the United States than in most other 
industrial economies. This is a factor which 
greatly affects American manufacturers' deci-
sions to upgrade plants and equipment. 
Equally detrimental to the competitive-
ness of the Big Three are the inefficient spend-
ing patterns established by their corporate 
traditions. In the early eighties, they had no 
good idea of what the American market wanted 
in spite of the enormous sums spent on market 
research. A good example of inefficient spend-
ing is Ford's entry into the luxury car market. 
Ford bought Jaguar for $2.5 billion and may 
have to spend another $2.5 billion to make it 
competitive. To enter the same market Toyota 
spent $700 million to develop the Lexus LS 
400.(Taylor, p. 64) 
Perhaps the most crippling aspect of the 
American auto industry is the long product 
development process. The Big Three still take 
about five years to develop a car from design 
through production. In contrast, the Japanese 
have cut the time to three years, making it 
possible for them to leap into new markets two 
full years before their American counterparts. 
Foreign car producers are not entirely 
without problems of their own. They face re-
strictions on imports, such as President 
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Reagan's "voluntary" limits on the number 
Japanese autos for sale in the U. S. market. 
Many Americans have a great deal of national 
pride and are fiercely loyal to the Big Three. 
There are also macroeconomic forces at work 
against the foreign producers. At the time of 
this writing, the dollar is relatively weak against 
the yen and the deutschmark. If the dollar 
weakens further to 120 yen, the Big Three 
could enjoy a price advantage they haven't had 
in a long time.(Taylor, p. 65) 
Because of these difficulties, foreign 
manufacturers are now trying to enter the 
higher-profit luxury car market. In 1987 about 
one-sixth of all imported automobiles sold in 
the United States were produced in Europe, 
but due to their high value they accounted for 
about one-third of the dollar value of all im-
ports. Since the voluntary limitations on im-
ports, the Japanese have also been trying to sell 
more profitable cars. They have established a 
solid reputation for quality and value in small 
and midsize autos and are now trying to enter 
the luxury market. In addition to the previ-
ously mentioned Lexus, Honda builds Acura, 
and Nissan builds Infiniti. Luxury cars are not 
the only market niche to have high value-
added status. The Japanese firms are also build-
ing sportscars like the Nissan 300ZX and the 
Mitsubishi 3000GT VR-4 to compete with the 
Corvette in the $30,000 to $40,000 range. The 
current battle for market share in the high 
value-added auto industry is likely to deter~ 
mine the place of American manufacturers in 
the beginning of the next century. 
In short, American auto makers have been 
losing ground to foreign competition in the 
small and midsize car markets while retaining 
a strong grasp only in the large luxury car 
market. This division of the market means that 
the price of the Clean Air Act Amendments will 
not be evenly shared. As I will argue below, 
American manufacturers will incur larger costs 
per car because of their fleets of larger models. 
Who Will Pay the Price? 
The costs of compliance with the new law 
which would theoretically be the same for 
every manufacturer are those of controls, 
onboard vapor recovery systems, warranty and 
recall increases, and loss of sales due to higher 
price. Hardware such as catalytic converters 
and vapor recovery systems should also cost 
about the same amount per car for each pro-
ducer. These costs could be lowered by good 
engineering work in the design phase. Simpler 
solutions to pollution control will result in 
hardware that is cheaper to produce and is less 
likely to fail, resulting in low recall and war-
ranty costs. Even a small cost savings in the 
production of each car adds up very quickly 
because of the size of the market. All manufac-
turers will feel the cost of falling sales due to 
passing the higher cost of emissions compli-
ance on to the consumer. 
Many of the provisions of the act will 
actually result in higher costs to American 
manufacturers than to their foreign counter-
parts. America's antitrust laws make it illegal 
for the Big Three to collaborate on pollution 
control technology which will clearly benefit 
the entire population. Each American manu-
facturer must therefore fund independent re-
search and development which will cost a 
great deal more than would a cooperative ef-
fort. In the current environment of lax en-
forcement of antitrust legislation, manufac-
turers may be able to cut development costs by 
the establishment of a joint consortium for 
controls research. However, manufacturers 
may be hesitant to try this approach since they 
were prose~uted for antitrust violations con-
cerning the sharing of emissions control tech-
nology in 1969.(Merson, p. 14) Collaboration 
efforts are also likely to be hindered by the fact 
that antitrust enforcement is subject to change 
with the political environment. 
Another reason why the costs of emis-
sions controls will be higher for domestic 
firms than for their foreign competitors is the 
Big Three's dependence on the large car mar-
ket. Larger cars require more sophisticated 
controls because of their larger engines. Many 
of these cars need "closed loop control sys-
tems" to meet the newly tightened emissions 
standards. These systems monitor the content 
of the emissions and send information to a 
microprocessor which regulates the engine 
operation. Closed loop controls are both more 
expensive to install and more expensive to 
maintain. They are also more likely to break 
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down and drive up warranty and recall rates. 
Furthermore, the higher cost of large cars will 
not just postpone decisions to buy, but will 
also induce some consumers to purchase 
smaller cars. This trend will not only hurt the 
Big Three when they need a large volume of 
sales to survive, but will also send many new 
sales to the makers of small cars, primarily the 
Japanese. For example, if one-fourth of this 
year's 300,000 large car buyers instead opt to 
buy medium and small imported cars, the loss 
to the domestic manufacturers would be about 
$1.5 billion. In an industry which averages 
twenty jobs per million dollars of wholesale 
output, 30,000 job-years would be lost.(Gushee, 
1988, p. 31) 
Conclusion 
Regulation has some far-reaching conse-
quences for the automobile industry. While 
necessary, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 carry with them associated costs that will 
have a negative impact on the competitiveness 
of American automakers. Although the law 
imposes standard requirements on all manu-
facturers of vehicles sold in the United States, 
the costs of making Detroit's larger models 
meet the new standards are higher than those 
of their competitors. While these new costs by 
no means constitute an insurmountable ob-
stacle to regaining lost market share, the Big 
Three will have to work harder to compete 
effectively. 
It is still too early to tell what effect these 
increased costs for the automobile industry 
will have on the American economy. While it is 
a certainty that manufacturers will increase 
automobile prices to meet the costs of compli-
ance with federal regulations, it is still unclear 
how many jobs may be lost. 
Of course, the economic costs of emis-
sions control regulations are offset by the 
benefits of cleaner air- primarily a reduction 
in future health problems and an increase in the 
quality of life. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to quantify the value of these other benefits of 
clean air for direct comparison with the costs. 
However, neither the true costs nor the true 
benefits of the new emission control regula-
tions will be apparent for many years to come. 
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